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Interdisciplinary efforts from developmental psychology, phenomenology, and philosophy
of mind, have studied the rudiments of social cognition and conceptualized distinct forms
of intersubjective communication and interaction at human early life. Interaction theorists
consider primary intersubjectivity a non-mentalist, pre-theoretical, non-conceptual sort
of processes that ground a certain level of communication and understanding, and
provide support to higher-level cognitive skills. We argue the study of human/neurorobot
interaction consists in a unique opportunity to deepen understanding of underlying
mechanisms in social cognition through synthetic modeling, while allowing to examine
a second person experiential (2PP) access to intersubjectivity in embodied dyadic
interaction. Concretely, we propose the study of primary intersubjectivity as a 2PP
experience characterized by predictive engagement, where perception, cognition,
and action are accounted for an hermeneutic circle in dyadic interaction. From
our interpretation of the concept of active inference in free-energy principle theory,
we propose an open-source methodology named neural robotics library (NRL) for
experimental human/neurorobot interaction, wherein a demonstration program named
virtual Cartesian robot (VCBot) provides an opportunity to experience the aforementioned
embodied interaction to general audiences. Lastly, through a study case, we discuss
some ways human-robot primary intersubjectivity can contribute to cognitive science
research, such as to the fields of developmental psychology, educational technology,
and cognitive rehabilitation.
Keywords: social cognition, interaction theory, neurorobotics, human-robot interaction, free energy principle,
developmental psychology, educational technology, cognitive rehabilitation
1. INTRODUCTION
At present, technology has permeated distinct spheres of human society, which has fundamental
implications for the research of cognition. Considering the field of robotics, in order to cope
with challenges of our times, it is important to study how the inclusion of robots can transform
the economic and social organization of our society (Granulo et al., 2019), and possible ways of
dealing with negative consequences of those changes. It is also crucial to explore how human-
robot interaction can serve beneficial purposes, such as helping in advancing the state of the art
in cognitive science, which is a guideline of our research.
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In this evolving context, several research communities with
distinct purposes have dedicated themselves to study human-
robot interaction in recent years. An aspect of central concern
is how to include the robot in interaction research. During
interdisciplinary conferences and encounters in our field, this
matter is manifested through the question: who is the subject
in the interaction?. From a methodological level of analysis, we
could roughly distinguish three main responses to this question.
That is, some studies include human-as-subject and robot-as-
input (HS/RI), others include human-as-input and robot-as-
subject (HI/RS), and probably very few studies, like the current
one, include human-as- and robot-as- subject (HS/RS). Next, we
describe briefly these approaches.
In HS/RI studies the internal structure of the artificial
partner is considered of secondary importance to the analysis of
experimental protocols, continent upon the quality of subjectivity
is placed on the human partner side. Thus, the robot is commonly
included as a typified black-box system that provides some
degree of input standardization, and observations are carefully
conducted on the human partner’s side. Under this perspective,
robots have been considered for assistance therapy to help
humans recover from sensory-motor deficits in some neuro-
psychological conditions (Gassert and Dietz, 2018). Robots have
also contributed to the acquisition of computational thinking
skills (Atmatzidou and Demetriadis, 2016), improving executive
functions of planning and control (Di Lieto et al., 2020), sensory-
motor gaming (Kose-Bagci et al., 2009), and metacognitive and
problem solving (Atmatzidou et al., 2018). Interaction has also
served to study neural development in autistic spectrum disorder
(ASD, Robins et al., 2005; Scassellati et al., 2012; Ismail et al.,
2019). Among several other studies that could be mentioned.
On the other extreme, HI/RS research is founded on the
interest in studying human cognition, under the expectation that
plausible theories in cognitive science can be constructed through
modeling and carefully implementing cognitive control schemes
in robots. Here, the human partner acts by stimulating the robot
during interaction. Thus, observations on the human side are
considered in terms of evaluating experimental hypotheses on the
synthetic prototype. Within this perspective, behavior-centered
studies have focused on robot tasks that could be directly
mapped to analogous research with human infants and children
(Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2015). Since the knowledge available
in developmental cognitive robotics is insufficient (Asada et al.,
2009), implementations are proposed from the designers’ limited
understanding of cognitive functions (e.g., to study foundations
of communication, Kuniyoshi et al., 2004). The research
conducted in our lab has taken inspiration from brain sciences
(Tani, 2016), for the proposal of composable continuous state
space neuro-dynamic structures (e.g., Tani, 2003; Murata et al.,
2013; Ahmadi and Tani, 2019) to study cognition.
In this work, we argue human/neurorobot interaction
constitutes a unique methodological opportunity to deepen
understanding of underlying mechanisms in social cognition
through synthetic modeling. Unlike other accounts, our research
treats both the human and the robot as agents involved in
an engaged continuous flow of interaction (i.e., a HS/RS
perspective), and studies the concept of primary intersubjectivity
in developmental psychology, through on-line dyadic direct
interaction. For this, we provide an integrative model of
agency and primary intersubjectivity, as it functions between
the human and robot, based upon the interaction of top-down
deliberative processes and bottom-up perceptual processes. From
our interpretation of the concept of active inference in free-
energy principle theory (Friston et al., 2013; Allen and Friston,
2018), we investigate interaction as a process of coupling, in
which neither agent resort to reading the “inner” or “mental”
goals, beliefs, and desires of the other. Instead, understanding the
other, in the form of emerging coordination, is achieved through
direct perception of embodied activity. We propose an open-
source methodology named neural robotics library (NRL) for
experimental research, and through a study case, we discuss some
ways human-robot primary intersubjectivity can contribute to
cognitive science research, such as to the fields of developmental
psychology, educational technology, and cognitive rehabilitation.
2. HYBRID PRIMARY INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Intersubjectivity is a concept that carries deep philosophical roots.
It is fundamental to Hursserl’s foundations on phenomenology
(Husserl, 2013), and received important contributions from
Heidegger (with the notion of being-in-the-world, Heidegger
et al., 1962), Merleau-Ponty (through the study of perception
and embodiment, Merleau-Ponty, 1996), and Habermas (in the
theory of communicative action, Habermas and McCarthy, 1984),
among several other sources. Dealing with the philosophical
complexities of the concept would certainly surpass our
current scope. Thus, our focus is rather placed on the much
more circumscribed sphere of developmental psychology, and
concerns the capacity of understanding others’ intentions,
actions, feelings, behaviors, or thoughts; through interaction.
Below, we establish five important scope delimitations of our
work, which concern: the experiential level of analysis, the
theoretical perspective, the sort of interaction, the perspective on
knowledge representation and prediction, and the nature of the
interaction partners.
A conceptual distinction in social cognition research has
been established to define the sort of access a person uses in
understanding another person. According to Fuchs (2013), from
an experiential level of analysis, the access possibilities to oneself
and others conform the triad: first (1PP), second (2PP), and
third (3PP) person perspective. Hence, subjective experiences
are accessible from 1PP, co-experiences or intersubjective
experiences (reciprocal interaction, forms of mutual relatedness)
are accessible from 2PP, and one-way, vicarious, or remote
observations are accessible from 3PP. An intense debate has been
established concerning the experiential level of analysis from
which studying intersubjectivity. As a first scope delimitation,
our research focuses on 2PP, which has been less explored in
the literature, probably due to the methodological challenges
it imposes.
Concerning the theoretical scope delimitation, several authors
(e.g., Gallagher, 2001; Fuchs, 2013; Newen, 2018) have pointed
out that studies of social cognition have traditionally explained
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how individuals understand and interrelate with each other
from the perspective of theory of mind. Notably, under the
approaches of theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). In
essence, from a 3PP experiential level of analysis, TT theorists
have investigated intersubjective relations as specialized cognitive
abilities for explaining and predicting behavior, based on the
employment of folk psychological theories about how behavior
is informed by mental states (e.g., Premack and Woodruff, 1978;
Leslie, 1987; Wellman, 1992; Gopnik and Schulz, 2004). ST
theorists have studied intersubjectivity from a 1PP experiential
level of analysis, as how mental experience becomes an internal
model for understating the other’s mind, so thoughts or feelings
of the other person are simulated as the subject would be in that
situation (e.g., Davies and Stone, 1995; Gallese and Goldman,
1998; Goldman, 2006; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014).
Developmental theorists have challenged theory of mind
accounts of social cognition, and described stages in the
development of intersubjectivity (Gallagher, 2008; Spaulding,
2012). Thus, primary intersubjectivity, originally described
by Trevarthen (1979), consists in a voluntary interpersonal
communication process characterized by intentionality and
adaptation, which is founded in innate, embodied, pre-
theoretical, non-conceptual fundamental capacities for self-
expression and understanding others (e.g., facial gesticulation;
proprioceptive sensation, automatic attunement, detection of
intentional behavior, eyes motion tracking, noticing emotions
in gestural intonation and expression, among others). Thus, it
implies the immediate experience of sharing subjective states,
in the sense that babies and mothers are biologically endorsed
with the capability to coordinate their actions with the other.
This ability facilitates cognitive and emotional learning through
social interaction. Secondary intersubjectivity is theorized to
be constituted later, transcending the face-to-face sort of
interactions to a context of shared attention, mediated by
communication about objects and events in the environment
(Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978). Conforming to Rochat and
Passos-Ferreira (2009), the stage of tertiary intersubjectivity is
characterized by processes of negotiation with others about the
values of objects, from shared and self representations.
The study of social interaction, as characterized by primary
intersubjectivity, is very interesting for us. As such, from
our approach in neurorobotics (which is discussed later
in the article), we aim at joining interdisciplinary efforts
by developmental psychologists, phenomenologist, and
philosophers of mind, which have constituted, in the last
decades, a diverse field of research that investigate four central
features of cognition. Thus, according to Newen et al. (2018), 4E
cognition is considered to be embodied, embedded, extended, and
enactive. Theorist in 4E cognition research cognitive phenomena
as dependent on the body characteristics (on its physiology,
biology, and morphology), on the particular structure of the
environment (e.g., natural, technological, social), and on the
active embodied interaction of the agent with the environment.
When considering the study of 4E properties of social
cognition, the critical movement against theory of mind
approaches was very much influenced by the proposal of
interaction theory [IT (Gallagher, 2001), also named embodied
social cognition; (Gallagher, 2008)]. For IT, experiencing the
feelings and intentions of another person is mostly accounted for
by a 2PP access to immediate perception of embodied interaction
with others, which constitutes a simpler, non-mentalistic, on-
line capacity. Hence, mind-reading skills (as studied in TT
and ST) consist in specialized forms of intellectual activity less
regularly used when basic embodied processes fail to account
for a given situation. Moreover, such abilities (e.g., perspective-
taking) are believed not to be matured enough at early infancy,
where the individual has mostly access to body sensations
(proprioception, vision, somato-sensation), and is capable of
basic motor skills (e.g., following others’ eyes, imitating facial
expressions, exerting rudimentary motor control, among others).
Although IT is not an uniform theoretical field, according to
Newen et al. (2018) theorist share the two following ideas:
(a) understanding others does not involve observing others
on a regular basis, but interacting with them, and (b) the
experiential access in understanding through interaction is
immediate or direct perception. Hence, as a second scope
delimitation, our research adopts the IT perspective for the study
of primary intersubjectivity.
Concerning the third scope delimitation, when analysing
differences amongst 4E cognition theorists in the study of
intersubjectivity, it is fundamental to precise how the interaction
situation is conceived and investigated. In this sense, for
enactivist theorists (e.g., De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), social
interaction is characterized by coupling, which maintains an
identity in the relational domain, and by individual autonomy.
An example would be walking in the opposite direction in
a narrow corridor, where individuals are attempting to stop
interacting but the interaction self-sustains notwithstanding
their will. Alternatively, conforming to Reddy (2010), it is
not the structure of the situation that determines a 2PP level
access experience in the interaction, but the fact of mutual
acknowledgment, emotional involvement, or engagement (e.g.,
sharing a smile, attraction, interest, surprise).
Our research is concerned with engaged interactions as
described by Reddy. A distinguishable aspect of our work is
the interest in direct interaction experiences characterized by
intention and purpose. That is, along with possessing means
for adaptation or fitness to other’s actions, individuals are
also capable of employing volitional resources to express their
intention. Consequently, dynamic control is shared within the
dyad. We believe that this sort of exchange is possible when both
agents are capable of, among several skills, processing feedback
and formulating proactive expectations on how the situation
would look like while enacting in the dyad (Tani, 2016).
The fourth scope delimitation involves disagreement amongst
4E cognition theorists on the importance of knowledge
representation and prediction. Conforming to Schlicht (2018),
some theorists have radically departed in a non-representational
approach and studied emergent interaction from dynamic
system theory, whereas moderate theorists have retained mental
representation in theorizing social cognition. Examples of the
former are studies of minimalistic interaction (Auvray et al.,
2009; Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Lenay and Stewart, 2012; Froese
et al., 2014). Concerning moderate views, according to Gallagher
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and Allen (2018), some interpretations of the general framework
of the predictive model are consistent with methodological
individualism (e.g., Hohwy, 2013), whereas others are consistent
with autopoietic enactivist theories (e.g., Kirchhoff, 2018a,b).
Notably, free energy principle (FEP) theory (Friston et al., 2013).
This work investigates primary intersubjectivity from the
perspective of FEP theory, within the scope of 4E cognition and
IT. We selected an interpretation of FEP theory which allows
us to study the capacity of understanding others without the
need of resorting to third person knowledge representation,
but based on direct perception of an error signal in 2PP
interaction. In this sense, in agreement with Allen and Friston
(2018), we study FEP theory as a synthetic account to explain
the constitutive coupling of the brain to the body and the
environment. Thus, internal representation and prediction,
in the generative sense, are considered to emerge from the
organismic autopoietic1 self-organization. Given the assumption
of ergodic2 dynamical interchange between the agent and the
environment, we investigate perception, cognition, and action
as explained by an enactive hermeneutic circle taking place in
dyadic encounters (Gallagher and Allen, 2018). For this, we study
interaction as a process where deliberative control and automatic
adjustment coexist.
Finally, concerning the fifth delimitation, when
deconstructing the section’s title semantics, it is important
to discuss the meaning of the term hybrid. It accounts for
the study of social interaction between two partners distinct
in nature. In this sense, an important issue investigated in
human-robot interaction has been human engagement, where
the uncanny valley effect (i.e., emotional response in subjects
from perceived human resemblance of synthetic objects, Mathur
and Reichling, 2016) has been reported. Differently from this
line of research, we focus on the inclusion of robots as they are
to study interaction, and not on how the robot could substitute
the human partner. In the next section, we briefly introduce our
approach in neurorobotics, by relating it to previous studies in
FEP theory, and describing how it can be useful to study primary
intersubjectivity within the perspective of 4E cognition and IT.
3. HUMAN/NEUROROBOT INTERACTION
Neurorobotic agents are inspired in brain science research.
It is generally considered that understanding brain functions
requires the integration of knowledge at multiple levels of
abstraction (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2007; Ishii et al., 2011;
Freeman, 2014). Thus, synthetic models can be proposed to study
distinct aspects of the brain, such as synaptic molecular protein
synthesis, how neuromechanical signals are transmitted, how
spiking activity in a single neuron unfolds, local cell assembly
circuits, and the whole brain network. We are interested in the
study of relational and organizational aspects of cognition by
taking a synthetic approach. Particularly, we employ recurrent
1Understood as the persistence of self-organization of an organism given its
characteristic dynamical structure, while interacting with the environment.
2Ergodicity implies that the average probability of a system being in a given state is
equivalent to the probability of being in such state when observed randomly.
neural networks (RNN), which are highly adaptable nonlinear
dynamical systems able to deal with both temporal and spatial
information structures.
Several architectures have been investigated in our lab
[e.g., continuous time recurrent neural network CTRNN (Beer,
1995), and multiple timescale recurrent neural network MTRNN
(Yamashita and Tani, 2008)]. More recently, a variational
framework named predictive-coding-inspired variational
recurrent neural network (PV-RNN, Ahmadi and Tani, 2019) was
proposed. The PV-RNN framework is selected as a case study
in this work for two main reasons: (a) to our knowledge it is a
unique architecture inspired by foundations of FEP theory, which
can perform learning of continuous spatio-temporal patterns,
as required for neurorobots, and (b) it is mathematically
formulated in relation to the variational inference literature,
which characterizes it as a relevant framework for several fields
of cognitive science.
Previous research has studied social cognition from FEP
theory. Thus, several works (e.g., Hohwy and Palmer, 2014;
Lawson et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2014) have attempted
to explain social behavior in ASD through the predictive
model account. Commonly, a theory of mind stance has been
adopted. This has been also the case for the research of
intersubjectivity and communication (e.g., Friston K. and Frith,
2015). In general, studying social cognition is tremendously
challenging from the methodological point of view. Regularly,
researchers have resorted to off-line computer simulations (e.g.,
Friston K. J. and Frith, 2015), or to on-line indirect interaction
mediated by virtual systems, as a means to exert control
over extraneous experimental variables (e.g., the technique
hyperscanning, Babiloni and Astolfi, 2014).
A peculiarity that emerges in dyadic direct interaction is
that actions depend on both partners’ interventions. Moreover,
several sensory and motor organs are simultaneously involved
and not only voluntary control, but spontaneous or covered
reactions are produced and regulated by the central and
peripheral nervous systems. Noticing this has been particularly
important for the study of neural development in ADS
(Torres et al., 2013).
The representation proposed in Figure 1 for describing
human/neurorobot interaction dynamics, takes into account
the previous considerations, and the theoretical assumptions
adopted in our work. The neurorobot is provided with
the capacities of agency (or deliberation) and compliance
(reactiveness, adjustment) in relation to the human partner’s
actions. In agreement with FEP theory (Friston et al., 2011),
the robot’s deliberative control is studied as a variational
optimization process that involves a hierarchical dynamical
representation, in which a top-down information flow
(developed by a generative process) characterizes the agency of
purposeful actions (or intention to behave) in the interaction
context, and a bottom-up information flow (an inference
process) accounts for their consequences; so conflicts possibly
appearing between these two processes are attempted to be
reduced through minimizing free energy as a statistical quantity.
Compliance is a fundamental capacity for social interaction
which is based on the awareness of others’ intentions and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 584869
Chame et al. Human-Neurorobotics Primary Intersubjectivity
FIGURE 1 | Control is shared in the interaction based on the individuals’ capacities of enacting agency and compliance. The capacity of agency is studied through the
optimization of free energy (surprise) in short-term memory of direct perception. Hence, from the robot’s unique past, an intended future is reinterpreted in the
hierarchical RNN for deliberation control and projected in the perceptual space. The capacity of motor compliance is modulated as a proportional integral (PI) control
scheme for automatic adjustment of the body to the actions induced by the partner.
knowing what those intentions refer to. This capacity has been
studied from a developmental perspective at its early emergence
(Reddy et al., 2013; Reddy, 2018). When contextualizing our
work in the IT literature, we hold the assumption that automatic
processes are available to the person, so the body reacts by
adjusting to some extent to the partner’s actions. Here, we do not
study nor evaluate this assumption, this is an aspect that remains
for a further examination. Thereby, we focus on understanding
deliberation in the dyad from our interpretation of FEP principle
theory, taking automatic adjustment as granted.
Our previous research (Chame and Tani, 2020) has shown
in on-line human-robot interaction a possible way in which
compliance, as a cognitive (volitional) dynamic process, can
relate to reactive motor adjustment. Hence, cognitive compliance
was studied as a dynamical integrative optimization process
that characterizes how deliberation is influenced by sensory
stimulation induced by the partner’s actions in the dyad. Thus,
it was shown how an agent with strong belief tends to act
egocentrically to the environment without changing its internal
state or intention, whereas an agent with weak belief tends to
act adaptively to the environment by easily changing its internal
state or intention, while the capacity of motor adjustment was
kept constant.
We consider that the perspective adopted here for studying
primary intersubjectivity is consistent with the characterization
provided by Trevarthen (1979), who views this construct as
a deliberative-compliant process. Therefore, we propose to
investigate enactivist social cognition in human-robot interaction
as a relevant methodological approach for several fields of human
science research, which is discussed in section 5. We are aware
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 584869
Chame et al. Human-Neurorobotics Primary Intersubjectivity
of the difficulties involved in presenting concepts originated
within distinct research fields into a coherent interdisciplinary
theoretical formulation. For this reason, we find it pertinent to
dedicate the remainder of the current section to introduce such
fundamental concepts with minimal mathematical formulation,
under the modality of a questions and answers panel discussion.
3.1. What Is Free Energy?
Free energy principle theory was initially proposed as a unifying
framework in brain science (Friston, 2010). More recently, the
theory has been extended and related to the fields of theoretical
biology, statistical thermodynamics, and information theory
(Friston et al., 2013). A core assumption in FEP theory is that
living organisms are driven by the tendency to resist the second
law of thermodynamics, so to maintain their internal structure or
dynamics in a constantly changing environment.
Conforming to Allen and Friston (2018), from this
fundamental drive for existence, biological system are
characterized by the following properties: ergodicity (an organism
occupies or revisits some characteristic states more than others
over time in order to live), Markov blanket (a mathematical
description of the boundaries between the organism and the
environment, such description is undertaken at multiple levels
of analysis), active inference (perception and action are locked
in a circular causality relation), and autopoiesis (emergent and
self-organized maintenance of organismic dynamic structure
while interacting with the environment).
FEP theory consists in a predictive account of the mind.
It considers that an agent proactively anticipates sensation
from empirical priors (in a generative sense), and minimizes
free energy as a measure (an upper bound) of surprise. As
a consequence, the internal state of the agent is maintained
within characteristic or habituated regions. Thus, less/more
sensory surprise means lower/higher free energy, with more/less
likelihood of internal dynamics unfolding in a given region.
3.2. How Is Free Energy Minimized?
Generally, free energy is considered to be minimized in two
fundamental ways: through predictive coding, for vicarious
perception, and through active inference, for goal directed action
(Friston et al., 2011). In predictive coding, surprise is minimized
in a bottom-up pathway, so the internal state is modified to
generate more consistent predictions with respect to sensory
evidence. This principle has been explored in theory of mind
studies of social cognition (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007; Koster-
Hale and Saxe, 2013; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). Differently, in
active inference sensory predictions are attempted to be fulfilled
in a top-down pathway, by taking purposeful actions in the
environment (Friston et al., 2010).
Regardless of the way surprise is minimized, in FEP theory
it is assumed that sensation prediction is accompanied with
an estimate of precision. Hence, surprise is considered to be
minimized in relation to (divided by) precision, which means
that free energy is minimized more when associated with a high
precision estimate (i.e., a strong belief). A practical implication
of the previous statement is that an agent with strong belief tends
to act egocentrically to the environment without changing its
internal state or intention, whereas an agent with weak belief
tends to act adaptively to the environment, by easily changing its
internal state or intention.
This work focuses on the study of enactivist social cognition
based on active inference. As pointed out by Friston et al.
(2011), in active inference no distinction is established in
terms of sensory or motor representations, since motor
control signals are considered to be directly generated by
proprioceptive predictions, so the individual perceives relevant
action affordances in the interaction context. This is going to
be discussed in more detail when considering the matter of
perception as a direct experience. In the Appendix sections,
active inference is described within the scope of our case study,
which includes the PV-RNN framework. The minimization of
free energy is equivalent to the maximization of the sensory
evidence lower bound (ELBO), which is discussed in the
next question.
3.3. What Is the Evidence Lower Bound?
The ELBO is a quantity introduced in the variational Bayesian
(VB) optimization literature. In FEP theory, this quantity
corresponds to the subtraction of two terms, namely the
accuracy term, representing the prediction error, or surprise;
and the complexity term, representing the complexity of the
internal representation. Minimizing free energy is equivalent
to maximizing the ELBO. Mathematically, accuracy is the
expected logarithm likelihood of the model with respect to
the approximated posterior distributions, and complexity is
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL divergence) between the
approximated posterior and the prior hidden distributions.
Therefore, by definition ELBO ≤ 0 is an upper limit for the
logarithm of the marginal likelihood in the anticipation of the
sensory state by the generative process (see the mathematical
details in the Appendix B section). For human-robot interaction
experiments it is perhaps more intuitive to relate surprise to
the negative evidence lower bound (N-ELBO), since increases
in N-ELBO correlate with situations where mismatch increases
between the anticipation and actual sensation.
3.4. Is Perception a Direct Experience?
In the study of perception-action, two schools have contrasted,
namely, the contructivist and the ecological theory of perception.
These theories have developed over several years. Here, only
their basic characterization is presented. Thus, constructivist
theorists are very much influenced by the Helmholtz’s notion
of unconscious conclusion (von Helmholtz, 2013). It is generally
assumed that stimulation reaching the sensory apparatus is not
sufficient for perception, so intermediate processes (e.g., memory,
perceptive schemes, previous experience) intervene between
sensation and perception, which characterizes an inferential and
indirect process. Contrarily, the ecological school, under the
influence of Gibson’s studies of visual perception (Gibson, 2014),
considers that information available in the ambient suffices,
since what is perceived are changes over time and space (an
information flow). Accordingly, individuals perceive affordances
(i.e., functional utilities with respect to themselves and their
action capabilities) of objects or the environment. Consequently,
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perception is studied under the ecological school as a direct or
immediate process.
Constructivist theories of perception have been associated
with cognitivism, when attributing a predominant role to the
brain in the top-down information processing of sensory data
(e.g., Gregory, 1974), which largely neglects the richness of
information available at the sensory level. However, although
neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical
scientific evidence has supported the coexistence of constructivist
and ecological perceptive processes in the brain (Norman,
2002), according to de Wit and Withagen (2019), ecological
psychologists have been criticized for ignoring the brain in their
theoretical formulations.
More recently, Linson et al. (2018) have argued that when
replacing traditional inferential explanations, based on the notion
of passive input, with the notion of active input, ecological
theorists still maintain an input-output account of perception.
According to the authors, active inference is characterized in
FEP theory as direct engagement (in the thermodynamic sense)
between the agent’s sensory system and the environment. Thus,
sensation is considered to be anticipated from a generative
process, which does not constitute an inferential process in the
input-output sense. As pointed out by Bruineberg and Rietveld
(2019), perception and action from anticipatory dynamics and
free-energy minimization ensure the agent with the capability of
maintaining adaptive sensibility to relevant affordances in a given
context. This would not be about reconstructing the structural
hidden causes of the environment.
This debate has been certainly inspiring for artificial
intelligence and robotics research. It could be relevant bringing
up to discussion influential works by Brooks in behavioral
robotics (e.g., Brooks, 1990, 1991). The field was also influenced
by Braitenberg (1986). In behavior robotic agents, sensory input
has been directly mapped to motor output. This idea would
arguably conform to principles of the ecological theory of
perception (Tani, 2016). Although interesting behavior can result
from minimal control schemes, this sort of robot is only capable
of reacting to the environment. Lacking of intention, they behave
in stereotyped ways and exhibit low capacity of generalization,
even to slightly different situations.
In the approach adopted in our research, robots are capable
of active inference, so they perceive action affordances directly
as a vector flow in the perceptual space (i.e., no distinction
is established in terms of sensory or motor representations).
Hence, such neural robots try to fulfill their intention in the
interaction by directly performing afforded actions making sense
in a given context.
4. CASE STUDY: INTERACTING WITH
VCBOT
This section presents the methodological details of the case study.
It starts by discussing the relevance of the interaction scenario
for the research of primary intersubjectivity, and introducing
the proposed tools. Next, the case study is presented in four
stages, concerning the modeling and training of the neurorobotic
prototype, the report on the interaction experiment, and the
analysis of data. Finally, the section discusses how the case study
supports the theoretical formulation of primary intersubjectivity.
4.1. The Tool Proposed
Differently from the mother-infant interaction study conducted
by Trevarthen (1979), which consists in distant face-to-face
interaction from visual and auditory feedback, we decided to
explore engaged direct interaction between the human and the
robot (i.e., both are in physical contact). This is mostly due to the
fact that prototyping interoceptive sensory feedback requires of
less control of extraneous variables (e.g., the scene disposition,
illumination, ambient noise, etc.) for conducting experiments.
Furthermore, models based on exteroceptive data tend to be
considerably more expensive in terms of computation resources,
which would negatively impact real-time performance.
Another important simplification of our studied scenario is
that, unlike with infants, we focused on proposing a robotic
prototype with a reasonably limited behavior repertory and an
exclusive attentional focus in motion generation. In Trevarthen’s
study it was observed that infants eventually attenuated the
production of dyadic goal-directed gestures and did not visibly
respond to the mother for a while, by getting distracted with
something else or exploring their own body. These alternatives
were not provided in the robot prototype.
The case study was also inspired in our previous research
(Chame and Tani, 2020), which has shown that both the human
and the robot are able to process feedback from each other,
so congruent and complementary behavior can emerge in the
interaction. An interesting aspect shown in the study is that
the robot’s behavior did not correspond to an input-output
mapping scheme where human intentionality is simulated, but to
the development of an artificially embodied form of intentional
behavior control.
From the previous considerations, as it is detailed in
Appendix A, we propose a methodological resource named
Neural Robotics Library (NRL)3 for designing neural agents.
The library can be used to prototype agents (both physical or
virtual robots), capable of behavior control for human-robot
interaction. During experiments, the subjective state of the agent
can be recorded and become a valuable resource to investigate
on-line social cognition. This information can be combined
with measures on the human side, and allow the study of
HS/RS dynamics.
The virtual Cartesian robot, shortly named VCBot, is a
program relying on NRL which is designed for interaction
with an artificial neural agent through the computer mouse4.
3By considering computational requirements from previous experiences with
diverse robot tasks (e.g., manipulation in Chame and Martinet (2015), human
inspired locomotion and object approach in Chame and Martinet (2016a), walk
with top-down and bottom up visual attention in Chame and Martinet (2016b),
the C++ programming language (Stroustrup, 2020) was selected for developing the
NRL project. The software is released under the terms of the 3-Clause BSD License
in the github repository https://github.com/oist-cnru/NRL.
4The program is released under the terms of the 3-Clause BSD License at
the github repository https://github.com/oist-cnru/VCBot. VCBot is modeled
as a two degrees of freedom robot articulated by prismatic joints (Khalil and
Dombre, 2002). The software is implemented as a client application in the python
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Compared to real robots experiments, VCBot is a conceptually
different platform proposed with the hope of illustrating our
theoretical formulation, without counting on robotic hardware.
That is, in VCBot the human cannot receive proprioceptive
feedback from the robot intention through the mouse, but only
observe the trajectory of the end-effector. Concretely, we propose
as a case study an interaction task that consists in drawing the
body parts of a macaw cub. The graphical user interface (GUI) is
conceived following a notebook layout (see Figure 2). It includes
in dedicated tabs the four methodological steps implemented in
NRL (see Appendix A, Figure 1), which is discussed below.
4.2. Modeling
Agent modeling starts by the selection of the network features.
The PV-RNN parameters shape important qualities such as
compliance in the deliberation style of the agent. Unfortunately,
the selection of parameters cannot be done analytically, so the
method of trial-and-error should be employed. Table 1 provides
a qualitative description of the parameters’ role and some hints
on their selection. An important aspect to consider is that
computational complexity is conditioned to the number of
FIGURE 2 | VCBot in experiment mode ready for interaction. The training
dataset (in watermark color for reference) includes behavior primitives globally
shaping a macaw cub. The end-effector is represented by the red circle.
Recent behavior is shown in light blue (the robot is reproducing the shape of
the head).
programming language (Van Rossum and Drake, 2011), which runs on the top
of the NRL back-end. The project is documented in details, with descriptions on
the operation modes available. Tutorial videos for installation and operation are
proposed in the project’s repository.
intermediate layers and the amount of neurons within layers.
Therefore, it is recommended to start by profiling a reduced
structure and gradually increasing its complexity until it is
able to handle the task. This iterative process is represented in
Appendix A, Figure 1 as the cyclic flow labeled improvements.
For reference, the models included for demonstration in VCBot
comprise two layers: the Low layer is composed of 40 d units, 4
z units, and the time constant set to 2; whereas the High layer is
composed of 10 d units, 1 z unit, and the time constant set to 10.
4.3. Training
The objective of constituting training sets is to capture
fundamental behavior on the robot side for studying during
interaction. Thus, depending on the theoretical aspect under
consideration, such basic skills could be assumed to be either
innate to the agent, or acquired through developmental sensory-
motor processes (e.g., through motor babbling, imitation).
A convenient method used for registering behavior primitives
is kinesthetic demonstration, where the human directly moves
the robot body to show the behaviors. For the case study, a
two-dimension motion primitive set was constituted, inspired
by the body shape of a macaw cub (perhaps on the species ara
ararauna). A total number of seven primitives were included,
registered at 100 ms sampling period, during 72 time steps,
conforming limit cycles in a clockwise sense. These trajectories
represented distinct anatomic regions of the bird (i.e., the left
eye, the head, the beak, the neck, the right wing, the belly,
and the left wing). Only individual primitives were included
TABLE 1 | PV-RNN parameters selection.
Parameter Description
z units Represent the stochastic latent state in the prior and
posterior distributions (see Appendix B, Equations 4, 8).
In PV-RNN these units encode a Gaussian distribution
parameterized by a mean (or expectation) µ and a
standard deviation σ , so z = µ+ σ *ǫ with ǫ sampled
from N (0, 1).
d units Represent the deterministic latent state (see
Appendix B, Equation 3). As a rule of thumb they are
set ten times more numerous than z units.
Regulation w Is a meta-parameter which influences the learning of the
posterior and the prior distributions (see Appendix B,
Equation 14). In general, the higher the parameter is set,
the more similar the hidden prior and posterior
distributions would be, so the internal representation
would be less sensitive to stochasticity during interaction
(when deliberating, the agent would comply less to the
partner’s intentions). On the other hand, if w is set too
low, the agent’s generative process (based on the prior
distribution) would be poor, so deliberation will tend to be
erratic.
Timescale constant The timescale conditions the temporal dynamics of the
layers. The constant should be selected increasing
proportionally between adjacent layers from the lowest
to the highest, so low layers present faster dynamics
than higher layers. For example, assuming a
configuration of three layers, in case ιmiddle = 5ιlow (see
Appendix B, Equation 2), then ιhigh = 5ιmiddle.
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FIGURE 3 | Training was optimized during 50,000 epochs. The parameter selected for the Adam method were α = 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999. The posterior and
prior reconstruction errors are calculated by taking the softmax transformation on training data along every degree of freedom of the robot, and computing the sum of
the Kullbach-Leiber divergence between the training reference and the output generated by the network from the posterior and the prior distribution, respectively.
in the dataset, so the robot did not learn how to relate one
primitive to another. Hence, an important aspect to observe is
whether possible relations between previous knowledge emerge
during interaction.
The model was trained during 50,000 epochs (see Figure 3),
following the Adammethod for stochastic optimization (Kingma
and Ba, 2014). As noticed on the top row, the network optimized
faster the reconstruction error (the accuracy component of
the ELBO, or the expected logarithm likelihood of the model
with respect to the approximated posterior distributions, see
Appendix B, Equation 14) related to the posterior distribution,
and gradually improved the results for the prior distribution,
which can be noticed in the way the signal corresponding to
the regulation error decreases (at the bottom-left, it represents
the complexity component of the ELBO, that is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the approximated posterior and the
prior hidden distributions). This means a gradual increase of
complexity in the model, since the prior and the posterior
distributions are becomingmore similar. Thus, as seen in the plot
on the bottom-right, the negative ELBO is minimized over the
training epochs.
After training, the primitives were generated from the prior
distribution to evaluate the quality of behavior achieved. As seen
at the top of Figure 4, the generation process could reproduce
in overall the body shape of the macaw cub, as compared with
the training set trajectory shown in watermark color in Figure 2.
For observing the internal representation self-organized by the
network, two principal component analysis (PCA) from the
activity of d units at the High layer (slowest dynamics) were
plotted at the bottom of the figure. An important aspect to
be noticed is the connectivity between regions in the internal
representation. Hence, some primitives are represented inter-
connected whereas others are not. The absence of connectivity
should imply higher difficulty in switching between those
attractor regions, this is going to be discussed in more details
when analyzing the interaction results. It is also important
noticing that although there may be overlap in the regions, the
flow of activity could be in the opposite sense. Since all the
primitives were captured clockwise, their internal representation
also preserved those spatial-temporal relations.
4.4. Experiment
The goal of the human-robot interaction experiment was to
observe mutual interaction and influence between the partners.
For this, the human was instructed to reproduce with the
robot the body part of the macaw cub. In the experiment it is
not important that all primitives are covered, but how mutual
interaction in both directions could develop. Thus, the robot was
set to start generating one of the primitives, and the human was
instructed to try for each primitive by turn to cover the behavior
repertory as much as possible, within a given time. The human
was also instructed to proceed at will, so no predetermined order
was recommended in trying to accomplish the primitives. After
the experiment, the human was requested to verbally report on
the primitives attempted with the robot.
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A simple proportional controller was designed to endorse
the robot with the capacity of enacting deliberation and
adjustment (motor compliance) in relation to the human’s
FIGURE 4 | (Top) The seven behavior primitives representing globally the
body shape of a macaw cub were successfully learned by the prior generation
process. (Bottom) The resulting internal representation self-organized by the
network form training. It is important noticing the connectivity between
regions, and the sense of information flow in the attractors developed, which is
indicated by the orange arrows.
actions (see Figure 1). Thus, the position of the robot’s end-
effector emerging from the interaction was determined from
the linear interpolation of the human and the robot desired
actions, such that position = γ human − (1 − γ )robot. For the
study case γ = 0.9, which means the human exerted much
more influence over the position of the end-effector than the
robot did. We set this parameter in this way by considering an
analogy to adult-infant interaction situations where the adult’s
motor system is much more developed and capable than infant
motricity. Thus, it would be close to a situation where the
mother grabs the infants hand and gently moves it to obtain a
response from the infant. In order to avoid brusque changes in
the motion trajectory, the position rate of change was saturated
by a constant factor.
In the experiment, the human interacted with VCBot during
approximately 3 min and 20 s. Data was captured during 2,000
time steps, at every 100 ms. The human desired actions were
registered as the coordinates of the mouse cursor. In VCBot
the human chooses when to enable interaction by pressing and
holding the control key from the computer keyboard while
moving the mouse. Therefore, both the position of the mouse
cursor and the key press event were recorded. The robot desired
actions were generated by the neural network. The negative
ELBO was also recorded as a measure for real-time minimization
of free energy. Several repetitions of the experiment were
performed, Figure 5 shows the time evolution of data captured
for the most interesting trial. A total of eight human intervention
events were produced during the experiment. Table 2 presents
the human self-reported intention on the events. These results
are analyzed next.
4.5. Analysis
A quantitative measure of intentionality congruence is proposed
based on an automatic regression observer. The objective is
classifying the robot and the human intention from the observer’s
evaluation, which receives as input the intended behavior
signal, buffered in a limited temporal window, and outputs
the attribution of the signal to a behavior category (i.e., a
TABLE 2 | Human intention self-report.
E Description
1 The robot was doing Head, the human intended to do Beak, so the
robot could switch accordingly.
2 The robot was doing Beak, the human tried to do Head, which the
robot accomplished.
3 The robot was doing Head, the human successfully induced a change
to Eye.
4 The robot was doing Eye, the human tried Neck for a while, however
the robot switched to Left-wing.
5 The robot was doing Left-wing, the human tried again Neck, so the
robot could follow up this time.
6 The robot was doing Neck, the human induced a switch to Belly.
7 The robot was doing Belly, the human made it change to Right-wing.
8 The robot was doing Right-wing, the human tried in vain switching to
Left-wing.
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represented body part of the macaw cub). This problem is
analogous to some extent to the comparison of time series for
speech recognition (e.g., Sakoe and Chiba, 1978). Thus, two
conditions are assumed in the comparison: (a) patterns are time-
sampled with a common and constant sampling period, and (b)
there is no a priori knowledge about which parts of the patterns
contain important information.
The automatic regression observer corresponded to a feed-
forward model with the following layered structure: 10 input
units (2 degrees of freedom × 5 time steps buffer window),
150 units in the first hidden layer, 100 units in the second
hidden layer, 7 output units (representing the macaw cub body
parts categories). The hyperbolic tangent activation function was
selected for the hidden layers, and the sigmoid activation was
selected for the output layer.
For constituting the training set, the PV-RNN model
generated during 200 time steps each behavior primitive from the
prior distribution. Since the initial position was the same for all
generations (the center of the workspace), the first 20 generation
FIGURE 5 | In the plots the axes and labels are not shown for clarity. The
vertical component of the signals correspond for the top three plots to the
width and the depth coordinates of the robot’s end-effector. The N-ELBO is
shown in the two lower plots. For the plot Human-Robot Intention, a scaled
binary signal representing the control key pressing event by the human is also
shown. Temporal contiguous human interventions were grouped and
numbered. The horizontal component corresponds for all cases to the time
dimension.
steps were discarded, in order to ensure the effector position
entered the limit cycle attractor of each primitive, consequently,
the training sequences had 180 time steps.
The test set was constituted with data captured from the
human. The subject was instructed to manipulate the mouse
to generate in VCBot the primitives, provided a visual guide
on the dataset (data was plotted in watermark color in the
workspace). The confusion matrix is presented in Table 3. As
noticed, classifications were reasonably accurate for the test set.
Figure 6 presents the automatic regression observer’s
performance for the experimental data. A first aspect to be
noticed is that classification for the human intention is available
only during the events illustrated in Figure 5 and self-reported in
Table 2, whereas data is available from the robot throughout the
whole experiment (except for the first 5 time steps, given the size
of the temporal buffer window). Although the interaction was
subject to stochasticity from the human motions and possible
incongruence in the human and the robot intention, temporally
TABLE 3 | Testing set confusion matrix.
Eye Head Beak Neck Rwing Belly Lwing
Eye 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Head 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Beak 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Neck 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.976 0.000 0.000 0.024
Rwing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Belly 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Lwing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.994
FIGURE 6 | The scatter plot presents the intended action from the human and
the robot actors, as evaluated by the observer. The human intervened a total
of eight times to influence the robot behavior, which is also illustrated in
Figure 5 and self-reported in Table 2.
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correlated classifications for the human actions are observed
around a main category and adjacent neighbors, which suggests
the human likely focused on particular parts of the bird’s body
during the interaction events.
In order to estimate the probability of intention congruence
for an episode i within an interaction event e, the binomial
variable ct ∈ {0, 1} is defined from the human ψ
human and the
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where Y acts as a low pass filter to reduce classification errors due
to observation noise.
Figure 7 presents the time evolution of the probability
of intention congruence, grouped by interaction events. As
noticed, for some events congruence was observed earlier in the
interaction (e.g., the events 1, 3, 6, 7), so the human was perhaps
not too sensitive to feedback from the robot and persisted longer
than required to induce intention switching. On the other hand,
FIGURE 7 | Events unfolded with distinct time length (horizontal axis). The
vertical axis shows the probability of intentional congruence (see Equation 3),
with Y = 10 time steps.
in the 5th event, although the probability of intention congruence
was not very high by the end of the event (it was estimated
to be 0.5), once the human ceased to intervene around the
time 110 s (see Figure 6), it is clear that the robot switched to
the human-self reported intention (see Table 2), so the human
was perhaps more sensitive to feedback from the robot in this
event. Finally, the events 4 and 8 were mostly characterized by
intention incongruence.
4.6. What Can Be Learned About Primary
Intersubjectivity?
The case study has presented an interaction scenario between a
human and a robot, from which one may formulate interesting
questions, such as: what is being shared between agents?, what
does each agent “know” about the other?, what do the agents
share or coordinate together?, how is this co-regulated in the
moment?, and more generally, what can be learned about primary
intersubjectivity through the case study?. A good starting point
to tackle these issues, is to evoke some important theoretical
formulations from the field of developmental psychology.
Thus, as described by Rochat and Passos-Ferreira (2009), it is
considered that by the age of 2 months basic neonatal imitation
(i.e., a mirroring process) gives way to first signs of reciprocation
in face-to-face exchanges, which are characteristic of primary
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979). These embodied interactive
practices would constitute the primary access through which we
understand others. However, as pointed out by Gallagher (2001)
in IT, they are not only primary in a developmental sense, but also
as an experiential second-person perspective of interaction.
The case study has shown that an intuitive form of
understanding emerges when interacting with the other, from
sharing an internal state of engagement (as described by Reddy,
2010), which results from the reciprocity or complementarity
of action. We have proposed a description of this process
based on free-energy principle (FEP) theory. That is, the baby’s
sense of the mother’s intention would be accounted for by how
much surprised (in a FEP theory formulation sense) the baby
is feeling while enacting in the dyad. Hence, the less surprised
the baby feels, the more he/she would be in tune with the
mother’s intention. So understanding the mother’s intention
would constitute a process informed by an emergent internal
state that the baby is able to experience on-line when interacting
with her. Consequently, from our interpretation of the concept of
active inference, understanding is viewed as a process of coupling,
in which neither agent resorts to reading the “inner” or “mental”
goals, beliefs, and desires of the other. Instead, understanding the
other, in the form of emerging coordination, is achieved through
direct perception of embodied activity.
This way of understanding is not guaranteed to be successful
all the time, as well as for all sort of subjects/robots. When
analysing Figure 7, it is possible to notice that occasionally the
human and the robot intentions were easily synchronized (e.g.,
in the events 1, 6, and 7 their intentions became similar early in
the interaction interval). Other times, the human persisted for a
while before human-to-robot alternations could take place (e.g.,
in the events 2, 3, and 5 the robot changed its intention according
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to the human’s intentions). Finally, at times the human had to
adapt to the robot’s intentions, so robot-to-human alternations
were produced (e.g., the events 4 and 8). Therefore, the duration
required for a change in either side would depend on the
characteristics of both partners and the dynamics of interaction.
If the agent has a weaker belief, its adaptation becomes faster. On
the other hand, if the agent has a stronger belief, its adaptation
becomes slower (Chame and Tani, 2020; Ohata and Tani, 2020).
These results present some similarities with respect to
situations described in mother-infant interactions (Trevarthen,
1979). They suggest that in our study the robot is occasionally
able to exhibit strong intentionality (or behave subjectively),
whereas in other situations it adapts to the subjectivity of the
human counterpart by modifying its own intentionality (they
demonstrate the capacity of intersubjectivity). We believe that
through the design of human robot experiments of this sort, it
is possible to study diverse aspects of social cognition, such as the
emergence of consensus in intuitive non-verbal communication.
As it was explained previously, the robot was not trained to learn
how to shift from the generation of one behavior to another. Such
changes resulted from the human actions on its body, and from
its capacity of perceiving action affordances that make sense in
the context of interaction.
5. DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES FOR
HUMAN SCIENCE
The previous sections have presented the foundations and the
proposal of a methodological resource for studying human-
robot interaction, through the modeling of neural cognitive
control, from artificial recurrent neural networks. An experiment
was described where a human subject interacted with a virtual
Cartesian robot via the computer mouse, in order to illustrate
the potentialities of our approach. In this section, we argue
on possible implications and perspectives for human science
research. Notably, we focus on the fields of developmental
psychology, education technology, and cognitive rehabilitation.
5.1. Developmental Psychology
The introduction section has contextualized our research
interests in the domain of enactivist social cognition. Notably,
in the study of primary intersubjectivity. Thus, we have been
inspired by Trevarthen’s influential work where maternal-
infant interactions were recorded and analyzed (Trevarthen,
1979). The work constituted a fundamental criticism to theory
of mind accounts of social cognition. It described intuitive
communication in dyadic interactions as a shared control
situation, where individuals reciprocally influence each other.
Although interaction theories of social cognition are not
consensual, there is a shared interest in studying dyadic
interaction as a second person perspective level of experience,
which corresponds to forms of mutual relatedness, co-
experiencing, or intersubjective experiencing through reciprocal
interaction. Our research is consistent with such agenda. Hence,
as shown in the case study experiment, the considered scenario
is characterized by direct interaction, where the human modified
the body posture of the virtual robot and received visual feedback
on the robot’s motion. Hence, the human tried to communicate
with the robot through corporal patterns or gestures. We have
shown in related studies with real robots (Chame and Tani,
2020) that this relation can be studied both ways in the physical
dimension, so the human and the robot are able to modify each
other’s body posture.
We have described interaction enactment as the agent’s
capability of taking deliberative action while conforming or
adjusting to the actions induced by the partner. Hence, behavior
emerges only partly under the volitional control of the agent. We
have proposed to study such dynamics from an interpretation
of FEP theory which is consistent with autopoietic enactivist
social cognition. Consequently, we investigate perception,
cognition, and action as explained by an hermeneutic circle in
dyadic encounters.
Given the context where IT emerged (i.e., opposing a
cognitivist view of social cognition), assumptions based on
knowledge representation and inference have been criticized
when studying primary intersubjectivity. This is pointed out
by Reddy (2018) when analyzing assumptions about the nature
and availability of mind that views early human communication
as a process where the infant infers other’s hidden mental
states. Grounded in FEP theory, our work does not study
primary intersubjectivity as a theory of mind skill. We have
argued that internal representation and prediction are considered
in the generative sense, from the organismic autopoietic self-
organization. As pointed out by Bruineberg and Rietveld (2019),
perception and action from anticipatory dynamics and free-
energy minimization ensure the agent with the capability of
maintaining adaptive sensibility to relevant affordances in a
given context, which would not be about reconstructing the
structural hidden causes of the other’s mind. Hence, the agent
perceives action affordances characterized by intention, and
tries to fulfill them to make sense in the interaction by taking
motor action.
Perhaps an interesting direction of research would be studying
the developmental aspect of human primary intersubjectivity
skills in human-robot interaction with subjective robots. As
pointed out by Torres et al. (2013), studying interaction is
certainly subject to considerable methodological difficulties, so
behavior measures of physical movements are rarely included.
We believe that behavior measures could be complemented
with the inclusion of the subjective dimension of the
robot partner, so achieving more informed psychometric
observations on real-time interaction skills. This can be a
relevant perspective for developmental psychology, since
most psychometric instruments evaluate interaction with
static objects. Therefore, intra-subject measurements could be
compared, in a longitudinal study sense, to observe the subject’s
development. Additionally, intersubject comparisons could be
constituted based on how subjects individually interact with a
particular robotic prototype.
NRL is a framework conceived for constant evolution, and
incorporation of novel neural network architectures. Ongoing
efforts in our lab are focusing on exploring the modulation and
understanding of prior bias or believe underlying behavior. As it
is described in the last part of the Appendix B section, the PV-
RNN architecture, which was taken as a case study in this work,
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is currently been extended for investigating initial sensitivity in
goal directed behavior.
Through the proposal of NRL, our work with neural agents
has described in detail the dynamics of action deliberation. It
could be argued that our proposal could have invested some
efforts in detailing the dynamics of action compliance. This
aspect was left out of scope mainly due to the fact that robotic
platforms are diverse. Furthermore, commonly affordable robots
are designed under the classical engineering modeling approach,
including conventional control schemes and architectures. Since
real-time responsiveness is a fundamental aspect, it is somehow
problematic proposing a control model that would run over a
virtual abstraction of the host native platform. Hopefully, in
the near future more bio-inspired robotic structures, capable of
evolving in the phylogenetic sense, would be available for most
research labs.
A final aspect to be discussed is that developmental
psychology studies in mother-infant interaction have reported
early behavior patterns as rudimentary, much distinct from the
stylized motions proposed in the case study outlining the body
shape of a macaw cub, which the artificial neural model learned.
Although it is possible to model rudimentary behavior in neural
agents, the inclusion of an artistic scenario is perhaps more
related to research perspectives on other fields in human science,
which is discussed below.
5.2. Dynamics, Consensus, and
Educational Technology
According to Ackermann (2001), societal convictions on the
meanings of being knowledgeable or intelligent, and what it
takes to become so, drive attitudes and practices in education.
Hence, several theories of learning (e.g., behaviorism, cognitivism,
constructivism, connectivism, constructionism) have reflected
those convictions, and have been central to the contributions of
theorists in education (e.g., Bloom, 1956; Siemens, 2005; Freire,
2018).
In education theory, we contextualize our work within the
view of constructionism, which consists in a philosophy of
learning through building artifacts in the world that reflect one’s
ideas. Undoubtedly, a key influential initiative in approaching
technology to education took place in the late sixties, and
consisted in the invention of the LOGO programming language
in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Seymour, 1980).
The idea was to include computers in education processes, so
that children learn to communicate with computers through a
mathematical-logical language, in order to build their own tools
and mediations to support their interest within a given context.
Constructionism has transcended the virtual world to ground
the prototyping of physical agents through the Lego Mindstorm
technology (Martin et al., 2000). This platform has been
extensively used in the international educational robotics
competition RoboCup. Notably, in the Junior league5, which is
dedicated to young scientists mostly enrolled in secondary high-
school. The Mindstorm technology has stimulated an explosion
of other proposals in assemblage robotics kits.
5https://www.robocup.org
Interesting questions are raised once new technologies
are incorporated into education, in particular, inquiring the
actual benefits those technologies provide to distinct academic
outcomes. Thus, the aspect of how educational robotics
generalizes to areas which are not closely related to the field of
robotics itself has been reviewed by Benitti (2012). The review
found that most of the studies (around 80%) explored physics,
logic, and mathematics related topics, which may suggest a low
capacity of absorption to other fields. Moreover, in the light
of the increasing availability of machine learning technology
(e.g., software libraries, and computational gadgets), one might
question the extent to which the complexity of such technology
is actually realized by the children. So in practice sophisticated
automation prototypes are not simply the result of putting
together a set of components which are not really understood
by the student (i.e., at the modest cognitive cost of connecting
black-box modules).
Our research tries to face the above criticism inspired by
efforts in describing the development of cognition and action
from a dynamic system theory perspective (e.g., in Thelen and
Smith, 1994). Hence, by focusing not only in observing how a
given behavior is manifested, but on describing it as a pattern
of change over time, and how such change can result from
the interaction of multiple subsystems within the individual,
the task, and the environment; we hope to be contributing
to a reflection on phenomenon which transcends a linear
logical causality understanding, to an hermeneutical description
of causality that takes place with the self immersion in a
feedback loop, so bringing to the foreground the notions of time,
intention, stochasticity, and interaction, to a regularly perceived
static world.
Perhaps the view of a non-interactive world is still deeply
rooted in our society. Arts has provided us with a criticism on
the static world view, though forms of expressions such as the
abstract expressionist movement. Hence, the painting technique
known as action painting (Rosenberg, 1952) reflects the physical
act of painting itself, so the work ismore the unfolding of an event
than a picture. Here, artists employ the forces and momentum
generated by their body to paint (an influential exponent in
this current is Jackson Pollock, some of his works are Mural
and Lucifer).
Returning to constructionism, we believe the modeling
of subjective robots, with which communication takes place
through negotiation in shared behavior control, would enrich
and extend the interaction scenario envisaged by Papert’s seminal
ideas. Hence, by keeping in mind the principles of roboethics
(Tzafestas, 2016), robots could be conceived as systems capable
of intention. We hope this sort of synthetic agent would
become relevant to other fields of knowledge beyond educational
technology. An example is rehabilitation learning, which is
discussed next.
5.3. Cognitive Rehabilitation and
Motivation
According to Sohlberg and Mateer (2017), the term cognitive
rehabilitation follows short when focusing on the aspect of
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remediation or compensation for decreased cognitive abilities, so
the term rehabilitation of individuals with cognitive impairment
would emphasize more precisely injured individuals (i.e.,
acquired brain injury, and traumatic brain injury) that are and
will continue to be the target of cognitive rehabilitation. In this
sense, although a fundamental goal for treatment is improving
and compensating cognitive abilities, a larger scope including
consequences for the personal, emotional, motivational, and
social dimensions of the brain injury, has been incorporated into
treatment plans.
Several evidence-based reviews have been conducted with
post-stroke cognitive rehabilitation treatment for specific
cognitive impairments, and concluded that although there are
some evidence in support, the effectiveness of treatments has
yet to be established (e.g., memory deficits in das Nair et al.,
2016, executive dysfunction in Chung et al., 2013, and attention
deficits in Loetscher et al., 2019). Recently, a work by Maier
et al. (2020) has proposed virtual reality as a methodology for
designing a rehabilitation program in several cognitive domains
conjointly, as an alternative to treating cognitive domains in
isolation. Along this line, we believe an interesting perspective
to follow consists in exploring rehabilitation tasks based on
shared control. Our results with VCBot have illustrated the
methodological possibility of such integration.
Regarding real robots, the study of Gassert and Dietz
(2018), proposes a classification for robotic rehabilitation
platforms into: grounded exoskeletons, grounded end-
effector devices, and wearable exoskeletons. These devices
are torque-controlled which allows designing diverse
interaction tasks involving passive, active-assisted, and
active-resisted movements, depending on the treatment
goals and the patient’s level of impairment. As discussed in
Chame and Tani (2020), when considering simultaneous
deliberation and adjustment, it is also possible to
profile interaction styles from the robot’s capacity of
taking purposeful actions, while accommodating to the
human’s intentions. These characteristics could enrich the
availability of task repertories. In this way, artificial neuro
cognitive control could become an interesting resource for
rehabilitation treatments.
A study by Goršič et al. (2017) has explored the benefits
of treatments based on interaction, and suggested that playing
competitive games with a non-impaired partner has the potential
of leading to functional improvement, when compared to
conventional exercising, through an increase in motivation and
exercising intensity. The study found a less pronounced effect in
cooperative games but a positive effect on motivation. Although
it is likely that the presence of a human partner plays a role
in motivation, in the study it is reported that some subjects
preferred to exercise alone. Perhaps a promising line of research
would be exploring whether the fact of intersubjective interaction
with a robotic partner would lead to higher life quality of subjects,
notably, for participants that opted for not interacting with
human partners.
Diverse additional studies could be discussed for analysing
possible ways neurorobots, capable of active inference, could play
a role in rehabilitation. By linking this section with the previous
one, we would like to argue the relevance of constructionism as
potentially contributing to intrinsically motivated engagement of
patients in planning, designing tools, and selecting goals. The
treatment could also benefit from observing patient’s motivation
dynamics (e.g., Chame et al., 2019), so a conjoint planning of the
treatment between the patient and the therapist is done.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This work started from the interest in exploring possible ways
neurorobots can contribute to advancing the state of the art in
human science. For this, our research was contextualized within
the field of enactivist social cognition, notably, in the study of
control sharing in dyadic interaction, taking place in primary
intersubjective communication. We proposed a methodological
tool for prototyping robotics agents, modeled from free energy
principle theory. Through the proposal of a demonstration
program for interacting, we have shown the potentialities
of our methodology for real-time human-robot interaction
experiments. Finally, we discussed three main perspectives
for human science. Firstly, we have argued for the inclusion
of neurorobotics as a resource for investigating embodied
social cognition in developmental psychology. Secondly, we
have discussed how our proposal is related to the theory of
constructionism in education, by contributing to move from the
learning of linear logical causality, to a circular understanding of
causality that takes place in the subject immersion in a feedback
loop when building and interacting with neurorobots. Finally,
we have argued on the relevance of neurorobots for the field
of cognitive rehabilitation, and how shared control interactive
tasks could complement treatment methodologies in physical
and virtual environments.
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